Abstract: Islam in Indonesian and
Introduction
The diversity of currents in Islamic thought has enriched the development of Islam in Southeast Asia. Islam Liberal ("Liberal Islam"), Islam Hadhari ("Civilizational Islam"), and Islam Progresif ("Progressive Islam") are currents in recent development of Islamic thought in this region. Geographically Islam Liberal is a concept developed by young intellectual activists in Indonesia linked to the Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. 2 Islam Hadhari is an officially-controlled version of Islam promoted by former Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. Islam Progresif is an umbrella term referring to a school of Islamic thought that could at once be described as liberal, moderate, or puritan. 3 To be sure, there are many other versions of Islam in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. In terms of organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah are the largest Muslim organizations not only in Indonesia but also in Southeast Asia. They also have own interpretations of Islam, and their members tend to be staunch followers. Great diversity also exists in the practices of and approaches to Islam in areas such as Aceh, Padang, Java, Lombok, and Kalimantan. 4 In sum, the development of Islam in Indonesia is very much heterogenuous. 5 This article addresses four main questions; how the concepts Islam Liberal, Islam Hadhari, and Islam Progresif are products of certain trends in Islamic thinking, the impact of these three interpretations of Islam in Southeast Asia (especially in Malaysia and Indonesia), the similarities though these works are concerned with Islamic law, it seems that Islamic thought had a close relationship with both Southeast Asian Islamic kingdoms and H{ aramayn (Makkah and Madinah). 9 The key point, as Azra argues in his dissertation, is that this era represents the first period of Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia. 10 Azra identifies Nurdin Ar-Raniri as one of the most important early mujaddids (reformists) in the Archipelago. 11 According to Peter G. Riddel, in fulfilling this role ar-Raniri was transmitting the reformist pulses originating in both Arabia and India, thereby stimulating the Islamization of the archipelago. 12 The second phase of Islamic thought in Southeast Asia began when Muslim thinkers started to be influenced by Islamic reformism in Middle East in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since converting to Islam the Malays have traditionally had a high reverence for the Hijaz -which holds the two holy cities, Makkah and Madinahand its `ulama> ', whom they regard as a source of religious and political authority, when the need for an authoritative decision arises. 13 In this Negara-Negara Islam (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1989) .
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Volume 05, Number 01, June 2011 phase the dynamics of Islamic intellectualism in Southeast Asia were influenced by the Middle East in a number of ways. First, pilgrimage to the Hijaz was seen as part of the process of learning Islam from "the true area of Islam" in the world. Some Malays did not return to the Archipelago because they wanted to continue their studies at H{ aramayn. Second, some Malays went to H{aramayn after graduating from local pondok/pesantren/surau to learn more about Islam from specialized `ulama> '. During this period they also studied the political situation in the Middle East, especially in H{ aramayn, Egypt and Turkey. Third, many `ulama> s also produced newspapers or magazines to dissiminate their reformist ideas in the Archipelago, such as Seruan Pilehan Timoer, Idaran Zaman, Pengasoh, and alImâm. 14 In sum, the early twentieth century was the period when Islamic reformism began to spread widely across the Indonesian Archipelago. Based on the reformist ideas of the Cairo `ulama> ', Indonesian Muslims engaged in the project of purifying Muslims' religious practices and voicing the need to reformulate Islamic doctrines in the light of the modern spirit of progress. 15 The third phase of Islamic thought in Southeast Asia began when Orientalists from Western countries conducted research on Islam motivated by both purely academic and colonial interests. They have played an important role in Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia. Historically, the coming of the Orientalists to Southeast Asia can be divided into three periods. Initially they came as travelers, writing reports on the situation of the Islamic communities in the region. 16 Many of their reports have become important sources for our knowledge about the situation of Muslims in Southeast Asia at this time. Second, they arrived in Southeast Asia as part of colonial missions. In this phase, the Dutch scholar C.S Snouck Hurgronje played a critical role in Islamic studies during his sojourns in Indonesia and Makkah in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 17 The other scholar who has had a key influence was an American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. Based on his research at Modjukuto, Central Java, in the 1950s, Geertz developed a typology in which Muslim society in Indonesia was seen as divided into three groups, santri, abangan, and priyayi. 18 Geertz's scheme of classification exerted great influence on scholars, both Indonesian and non-Indonesian, who attempted to describe Muslim society based on their socio-politico outlook. 19 Benedict Anderson remarks that political scientists largely adopted Geertz's framework but often utilized it in a subtly selective way. By treating the three aliran (lit. "streams") as parallel vertical pyramids they frequently overlooked or underestimated the power relation between them. 20 The third phase of the Orientalist influence on Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia has been the development of the field of Asian or Southeast Asia Studies in Western universities, which included the study of Muslims in the region.
The latest phase in Islamic Studies has arisen when Southeast Asian scholars began to produce their own interpretations of Islam, starting from early years after independence until the present. This group was certainly influenced by the thinking of Western countries, in particular the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, and As a part of the interaction with the West and the consequent Westernization and modernization of significant sectors in Muslim societies, a grouping (or "class") of "secular intellectuals" emerged. These people were similar to, and possibly both inspired and created by, their counterparts in the evolving modern societies of Western Europe and North America. 21 In Islamic Studies discourse this group could be described as "modernist", "neo-modernist", "secularist", "liberal", and "posttraditionalist". In fact, this terminology does not derive from "indigenous" discourse in Islamic studies (dira> sah Isla> mi> yah) but rather from the social sciences developed by Western scholars. Modernist scholars tend to go back to the Qur'a> n and Sunnah and develop interpretations that are adapted to the modern era. In this group Riddel lists scholars such as Harun Nasution, S.M.N Al-Attas, Nurcholish Madjid, Anwar Ibrahim, Hasbullah Bakry, Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, and Chandra Muzaffar. 22 Furthermore, he has categorized Nasution and Madjid as neomodernists, and Rais as a modernist. 23 Charles Kurzman lists a number of other figures whom he regards as modernists, including Achmad Dahlan, Syeikh Ahmad Surkati, Agus Salim, Ahmad Hassan, and Hasyim Asy'ari. 24 For Kurzman, the modernist movement was "the self-conscious adoption of "modern" values […] associated with the modern world, especially rationality, science, constitutionalism, and certain forms of human equality. Thus this movement was not simply "modern" (a feature of modernity) but also "modernist" (a proponent of modernity attempted to theorize the problem of secular thought in Islam. He specifically argues that (1) Secularism is included in the Qur'a> n and the Medinan experience; (2) The Umayyad and Abbasid states can also be regarded as secularist; (3) Military power played a very early and prominent role in the Caliphate, the Sultanate, and all later so-called "Islamic" forms of government; (4) Attempts to rationalize de facto secularism and to develop a secular attitude were made by the falsifah [Muslim philosophers]; (5) So-called "orthodox" expressions of Islam are in fact arbitrary selections and ideological uses of beliefs and ideas and practices perceived as authentically religious; (6) The whole status of the religious, of the sacred, and of revelation, has to be reexamined in light of a modern theory of knowledge; (7) All political regimes which have appeared in Islamic societies following their liberation from colonialism are de facto "secular", dominated by Western models, cut off from the classical theory of authority as well as from intellectual modernity; (8) …. laicité as a source and space of intellectual freedom to initiate a new theory and practice of authority, is a work also to be undertaken in Western societies today. 30 In Islamic Studies, those who challenge the accepted role of Islam in society may be called "secularists". This group tends to be regarded as always opposed to the fundamentalists (or "radicals", "Islamists", "Salafists", and "terrorists"). In fact, those outside hard-line Islamic movements, including modernists, neo-modernists, liberals, and posttraditionalists are often considered "secularists" in the minds of the fundamentalists. 31 Islamic thought in Southeast Asia can thus be divided into different phases, with each phase preoccupied by different concerns. In the first phase most thinkers tried to solve the problems of Muslims in daily life and save them from what they regarded as the dangers of Sufism. Although this current of thought was seen as reformism at the time, its concerns were quite different to the problems that concerned the reformists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -for instance colonialism, the backwardness of Muslims in education, and the problem of modernization. 37 The secularization of Muslim society is among key issues for scholars of liberal Islam. In Indonesia, the fierce debate about the merits of separating Islam and State came to a head following the declaration of independence of August 17 1945, in which the secularists were represented by Soekarno and the Islamists by Mohammad Natsir. 38 At that time the secularists were able to win the elections and the debates in parliament. It is not difficult to understand why the controversy about secularization, especially whether Islam should be the sole basis of Indonesia, should continue until today. 39 At independence the Islamic faction in Indonesian politics was divided into two groups. The first group agreed to join the government while continuing to argue the case for Islam to be instituted as the basis of the state of Indonesia. The second group rejected the government and proceeded to carry out a rebellion in West Java, Sulawesi, and Aceh, known as DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia or "Islamic State/Indonesia Islamic Force"). The aim of this group was the implementation of an Islamic state and Islamic law in Indonesia. By the early 1960s, however, the DI movement had effectively ended after all of its leaders had either been arrested or killed. 40 Following the return of Nasution and Madjid from their studies at Western universities, liberal Islam began to receive serious attention among Islamic scholars in Southeast Asia. Nasution was one of the most influential scholars in promoting liberal thinking in Indonesia in 1970s. After graduating from McGill University with a dissertation on Muhammad 'Abduh's theological thought, he taught at IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies). He argued that Indonesian Muslims were less developed in economic and cultural terms because they were generally theologically fatalistic and static. The theology of Ahl alSunnah or Ash'ariyyah, for him, seemed to be the primary source responsible for this state of stagnation and underdevelopment. 41 In the area of Islamic law Indonesians adhere to the Syafi'î school; in theology they affiliate themselves with Asy'ari, and in terms of moral conduct they follow Imâm al-Ghazzali. Nasution regarded this model of religious interpretation as narrow-minded, therefore an openness to Islamic reformism or modernism was a prerequisite for the development of the ummah. Nasution desired to replace the fatalistic or traditional world view (theology) of the ummah with one that is more dynamic, rational, and modern. 42 To solve this problem, Nasution began to change the paradigm of teaching Islamic studies at IAIN. He proposed subjects that had never before been considered at IAIN, including Introduction to Islamic Studies, Philosophy, Islamic Mysticism or Sufism (Tasawwuf), Islamic Theology (Kala> m), Sociology, and Research Methodology. 43 Madjid was the other scholar who played a critical role in promoting liberal thought in Indonesia. He became an icon of Islamic thought Indonesia when he introduced the phrase: "Islam Yes, Partai Islam No!" (Islam Yes, Islamic Parties No!) . Using such rhetoric, he encouraged his fellow Muslims to direct their commitment to Islamic values rather than institutions, even those with an Islamic basis such as 40 Jamhari, "Fundamentalism and the Implementation of Shari> 'a," p. 8. 41 Muzani, "Mu'tazilah Theology," pp. 101-2. 42 Muzani, "Mu'tazilah Theology," p. 102; Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 75-76. 43 Muzani, "Mu'tazilah Theology," p. 103.
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Islamic parties. 44 About his controversial address on January 2, 1970, when he made his controversial appeal, Madjid wrote, … I made this presentation because I expected a special, closed meeting with free discussion among the leaders of four young Muslim organizations. There was a strong reaction against my use of such controversial terms as "secularization,"
"desacralization," "liberalization," "socialism"… I was quite aware of the danger of publicity referring to these points. ... Some of my adversaries suggested that I "repent" and apologize to the Muslim community. This I could hardly have done. Despite my knowledge that the approach was wrong, I firmly believed that the purpose was right. 45 Besides Nasution According to its website, Islam Liberal offers a new interpretation of Islam as a religion based on a number of insights. 57 The first is the openness of the gates of ijtihad in every aspect. The second is its emphasis on the ethical-religious spirit, not the literal meaning of the text. The third is the acceptance of a relative, open, and plural truth. The fourth is its stand alongside minorities and the oppressed. The fifth is its affirmation of freedom of belief and faith. The sixth is the separation of ukhrawi (heavenly) and duniawi (worldly) authority, and religious and political authority.
Again, these specific issues do not constitute "a new interpretation" among Muslim scholars in Indonesia. A number of Muslim thinkers in Indonesia have previously discussed the issue of reopening the gates of ijtiha> d, such as Hazairin with his "National Mazhab", Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy with "Fiqh Indonesia", Munawir Sjadzali with his "re-actualisation of Islamic law", and Sahal Mahfud with his "Social Fiqh". Furthermore, the term "ethical-religious spirit" had been promoted by Mukti Ali in religious studies among Islamic scholars in Indonesia through his course on Comparative Religion at IAIN, inspired by the work of Jaachim Wach. 58 According to the JIL website the reason why the group has adopted the name Islam Liberal is because,
The name "Liberal Islam" illustrates our fundamental principles; Islam which emphasizes "private liberties" (according to Mu'tazilah's doctrine regarding "human liberties"), and "liberation" of the socio-political structure from unhealthy and oppressing domination. The "liberal" adjective has two meanings: "liberty" (being liberal) and "liberating". Please note that we do not believe in Islam as such -Islam without any adjective, as some people argued. Islam is impossible without an adjective; in fact Islam has been interpreted in so many different ways in accordance to the interpreter's needs. We have chosen a genre of interpretation, and by this way, we selected an adjective for Islam, it is "liberal". 63 The Islam Liberal group appears to have adopted the methodology of the Mu'tazilah in their mission to make 'aql (intellect) dominant over wahy (revelation). That is, their arguments are based on logic rather than Islamic revelation.
It could be argued that this latest manifestation of Islam Liberal in Indonesia is in fact a response to the recent rise of radical Islamic movements and their demands to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia and to enforce Islamic law, increased anti-Americanism, and other controversial issues in Islamic discourse such as the position of the Qur'a> n and the H{ adi> th, marriage between Muslims and nonMuslims, gender issues and secularization. Ulil admits to being frequently accused of being an ally of the Americans, a CIA agent, and of having unlimited access to American money. 64 In fact, many Islam Liberal projects are indeed funded by international agencies and, and they have been entrapped in the "be careful" academic environment post 9/11. 65 Indonesian publications, accuses JIL of promoting an evil logic, of being a form of terrorism, of being dangerous for Islam, of destroying Islamic theology, of being Orientalists and secularists, as well as being anti-dialogue. Fundamentalist groups debate the Islam Liberal activists in open public forums. Sometimes the debate is not about the main topic but rather a "battle of ayats," "the yellow books", and "the voices of `ulama> ' from the fundamentalist front." In one debate held in Yogyakarta, many of the participants accused Ulil and his friends of no longer being Muslims, but ka> fir (infidels). Ironically, these statements came from scholars studying at secular universities, rather than from the Islam-based IAINs or the pesantren students. 67 Fundamentalist groups in Indonesia often appear to be based at and find their inspiration from the secular universities.
Islam Hadhari; The Politics of "Islamic Civilization" in Malaysia
Since independence, politics in Malaysia has been dominated by the Malays. 68 When we speak of the Malays, it is difficult to avoid discussing the place of Islam in Malaysia, both politically and sociologically. The politicization of Islam has become a key factor in the Malaysian political terrain in recent years. It has found perhaps clearest expression in the so-called "Islamization race" between the ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and the opposition Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). 69 Political Islam has manifested great intra-communal tensions within the Malay community. As the two Malay political parties battle for political legitimacy and electoral support, the resulting competition has led to efforts to institutionalize Islam and expand the religious bureaucracy, thereby sharpening the debate over what Islam means in Malaysia and how it should be practiced. 70 There are two problems in attempting to situate the place of Islam in Malaysia. The first is the question of the relationship between Islam and the state, which, because it has never been satisfactorily resolved by Muslim thinkers, continues to play a vital role in the ongoing debate. The second is the shift in the meaning of Islamic debates that tend to adopt a perspective that is too focused on Islam as a unifying political and social force. 71 The most representative Islamic figures in Malaysia are from the Malay parties, UMNO and PAS. The political struggle between these two parties has had serious consequences for the implementation of Islamic teachings in Malaysia. PAS provides an interesting example with its attempt at constructing and enforcing a system of "Islamic democracy" in the two east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu. 72 Driven by the global resurgence of Islamic consciousness and strengthened by the enthusiasm of the new guard, epitomized by figures such as Fadzil Noor, Abdul Hadi Awang, and Nakhaie Ahmad, a rejuvenated PAS began pushing a more deliberate Islamic agenda in Malaysia as a political tactic to whittle away support for UMNO. 73 In UMNO there has also been much debate about the role of Islam in modern Malaysia. Basically, the roots of the controversy involve the question of how to bring Malaysia into the modern era with an Islamic coloring. But the real debate has been over the interpretation of the shari> 'ah, especially after Anwar Ibrahim joined the party in 1982. Since his days as leader of ABIM Anwar rationalized the theme of struggle for socio-economic justice with the ideals of Islam, and used this
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The step of bringing Anwar into UMNO has been interpreted as an attempt by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to weaken the Islamic opposition while at the same time strengthening the government's Islamic credentials. 74 This situation has had serious implications for UMNO in their election strategy because virtually all Malays are Muslim and most Muslims in Malaysia are Malay. The problem of identity has become a source of debate within UMNO itself. Under Mahathir Islam was brought to the forefront of UMNO and Malaysian politics, and many of Mahathir's ideas were adopted by UMNO and the government. He used Islam as a wedge to attack the opposition party PAS, accusing them of not being interested in Malaysia's development. UMNO resorted to controlling the mainstream media to generate public apprehension regarding the Islamic opposition. In an attempt to define the boundaries of Islamic politics in Malaysia the UMNO-led government regularly portrays PAS members as "fanatics" and "radicals" while portraying itself as the representative of "modern" and "progressive" Islam. Provocative remarks purportedly made by PAS leaders over the years and amplified by the government-controlled media have been used to promoted negative perceptions of PAS as "fundamentalists". 75 Mahathir's vision of Islam as a force for modernization and industrialization won acceptance from most non-Muslim Malaysians. Muslim Malaysians, however, tended to be uncomfortable with such ideas 76 since they seemed to imply giving special rights to "nonMalays', especially in the economy. Malays increasingly pressured the government to confer special rights on Muslims in the form of bringing back Malay culture with an Islamic coloring. 77 Following the general election in 1999 the tensions increased when PAS extended its political control beyond the northeastern state of 74 Jan Stark, "The Islamic Debate in Malaysia," p. 179. 75 Liow, "Deconstructing Political Islam in Malaysia: Umno's Response to Pas' ReligioPolitical Dialectic," p. 8. 76 Interview with Datuk Wan Wahid, a government official in Pahang, Kuantan, July 2004. Kelantan to Trengganu and become the main voice of the opposition. 78 The issues of Islamic statehood, the implementation of shari> 'ah, and the role of women were the subject of acrimonious debate between the two parties. In early July 2001 in his address to the Convention of the Barisan Nasional coalition in Kuala Lumpur Mahathir controversially declared Malaysia to be an "Islamic State". He made a similar statement in his address at the Gerakan party Annual Delegates Conference in Kuala Lumpur on 29 September 2001. 79 The following year he went even further by claiming that Malaysia was an "Islamic fundamentalist state" and could be proud of the fact. The Malaysian government's policies, he said, were consistent with the fundamental teachings of Islam. 80 He acknowledged that his views would shock many in the West "because they consider a fundamentalist to be someone who is violent and did all kinds of bad things". He said this perception was wrong and that it was not necessarily a bad thing to be a fundamentalist.
It was in the final years of Mahathir's prime ministership that the concept of Islam Hadhari began to be discussed in Malaysian government circles in the search for an electorally appealing concept of spoke about Islam Hadhari and the need for a globally competitive Malay community. He stated that "Islam Hadhari was a complete and comprehensive philosophy, with an emphasis on the development of the economy and civilization, and the building of Malay competitiveness". He also argued that Islam Hadhari was an approach that emphasized development that was consistent with the tenets of Islam and was focused on enhancing the quality of life.
Islam Hadhari was an effort to bring the ummah back to basics, to return to the fundamentals of Islamic civilization as prescribed in the Qur'a> n and the H{ adi> th. In fact, this interpretation of Islam was similar to the neo-modernism promoted by Fazlur Rahman, a leading Islamic scholar from Chicago University, who has had considerable impact in Southeast Asia since the 1980s through his works and his students. 83 Islam Hadhari can therefore be seen as a new name for neo-modernism in Islamic thought. This interpretation tries to open the gate of ijtiha> d for Muslims in the contemporary era by combining classical Islamic scholarships and Islamic civilization with modern or Western ideas and analytical methods. 84 Badawi's formulation of Islam Hadhari posited ten fundamental principles which Muslim countries were obliged to accept and follow: First, faith and piety in Allah; second, a just and trustworthy government; third, a free and independent people; fourth, vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge; fifth, balanced and comprehensive economic development; sixth, a good quality of life for the people; seventh, protection of the rights of minority groups and women; eighth, cultural and moral integrity; ninth, safeguarding natural resources and the environment; tenth, strong defense capabilities. 85 Badawi argued that the gates of ijtiha> d must remain open so that interpretations are suited to the prevailing needs and conditions of the times. 86 In his 2004 speech at the Jami Millia Islamia forum, Badawi suggested that the problems confronting contemporary Muslim societies today were not the problems of the sixteenth century and the solutions they need today did not lie with the notion of a shari> 'ah purportedly final and complete fourteen hundred years ago. 87 Badawi thus demonstrated his support for the position of ijtiha> d in his status as prime minister, as head of the BN, and as chairperson of the Organization of Islamic Conference. Islamic modernism and Islamic neo-modernism thus became a political agenda in Malaysia under a different name. Yet, it is clear that Badawi advanced such ideas in order to counter PAS's political activities in Malaysia, especially regarding Islamic interpretation in the political arena. In his address to the Jami Millia Islamia Badawi claimed that the opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party had politicized religion to the extent that it had claimed a virtual monopoly on Islam. Badawi even accused them of canvassing for votes by telling villagers that they would be assured of heaven if they vote for PAS. 88 Badawi's strategy of Islam Hadhari was divided into stages. First, he asked the people to acknowledge that PAS's interpretation to Malaysia. JAKIM proposes that Islam Hadhari is Malaysia's way to implement an Islamic State. 90 The official dakwah organization of Malaysia, YADIM, also supports Islam Hadhari. 91 For the academic community there is the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM) which holds frequent seminars to promote Islam Hadhari among scholars in Malaysia. 92 Badawi is thus able to exercise his power and authority through many channels. Islam Hadhari is therefore clearly an UMNO political agenda, but it is also colored by authority, missionary fervor, politics, as well as an academic panorama and aroma.
Badawi argued that it was PAS that politicized Islam, not UMNO. He claimed that it was not in UMNO's nature to trivialize religion. UMNO has never allowed religion to be used as a political tool, it staunchly opposes the use of Islam as an instrument to manipulate people's beliefs, and it has always ensured that Islam and Muslims are protected from such abuse of religion. 93 Yet, it is clear that Islam has frequently been used as part of a political agenda in Malaysia during the era of Mahathir Mohammad, who took every opportunity to argue that Islam could be reconciled with modernization and economic development. 94 Challenge and Response," JSRAS 17, no. 3 (2007), pp. 301-22. thinkers, activists, and `ulama> ' in the nineteenth century 103 spread the ideas of the reformists from the Middle East, influenced by tahayyul, bid'ah (heretical innovations), and khurafat, with the intention of purifying Muslim tradition practices. 104 During the period of intense political, discursive and at times physical conflict between the Kaum Muda reformists and the Kaum Tua we find the terms pembaharuan (renewal), nahd} ah (rebirth, renaissance) and modernisme (modernity) being introduced into the discursive economy of normative Islam for the first time. 105 Progressive Islam develops, Islamic reformism based on such ideas as tajdi> d and is} la> h} . Tajd> d is usually translated as "renewal" and is} la> h} as "reform", while ih} ya> ' means revival. Some scholars also use the Arabic word nahd} ah which translates as "rising," "awakening," "revival," or "renaissance". Historically, this term began to be used from the end of World War I. According to Jacques Waardenburg, the term "reform" (is} la> h} ) has three different meanings. 106 The first meaning connotes a return to the spiritual core of a religious tradition. In this context, the is} la> h} movement in Islam desired to return to the essential principles of the Qur'a> n as well as the early Sunnah (Prophetic traditions). The second meaning of "reform" is the adaptation of a religion to modern times and its demands which are different from those of earlier times. The third meaning of "reform" suggests the conscious introduction of self-critical reasoning in the religious domain, such as that expressed by the term "Reform Judaism".
These terms relate to the work and writings of Muh} ammad 'Abduh and Rashi> d Rid} a> . In Southeast Asia, their ideas were spread by Shaykh T{ a> hir Jala> l al-Di> n al-Azhari> , a former student of Ah} mad Khat} i> b and Can be divided into five categories. One, attitudes and orientations which help to make the individual a morally better person and, at the time, elevate the ethical content and quality of society. Two, attitudes and orientations which have a negative impact upon the individual and society, and therefore, contribute towards our understanding and appreciation of the positive moral 112 Safi, "What Is Progressive Islam," p. 48. values that we must uphold. Three, values associated with institutions or the human being's larger environment which serve to enhance the moral ballast of human existence. Four, worldviews and visions associated with the meaning of life and life processes which suggest that the different religions may, in some respects share similar outlooks on what they consider important in life. Five, realities pertaining to the human being and the human condition which, on reflection, seem to suggest that there are common virtues and vices in actual human behaviour that transcend religious dichotomies. 115 Muzaffar proposes that there are certain universal values brought by religion into the world. These include concepts of good and bad, right and wrong, and issues of ethics and morality. The subject of religious ethics has also been much discussed by Indonesian scholars such as Madjid, Wahid, and Abdullah. Islam Liberal activists in Indonesia have also put forward the issue of religious dialogue between Islam and other religions in Indonesia. In Malaysia, Muzaffar suggests that not enough emphasis has been given to developing shared principles and ethics in public life. 116 Even though Malaysia is a multi-ethnic state, Malaysia's races live peacefully, but separately -they have separate schools, separate friends, and separate social lives. 117 However according to Muzaffar, it is partly because multi-ethnic Malaysia continues to hold together that the ruling elite and the influential social stratum in general do not need to introduce a novel idea into the nation-building process -that of emphasizing common values shared by the different religious communities in the country. 118 It seems that progressive Islam is similar to other streams of Islamic thought in Southeast Asia, especially the modernists and neomodernists, although it tends to be more anti-American and is opposed to American hegemony in the region.
Conclusion
As an intellectual movement, Islam Liberal differs from Islam Hadhari in that it does not originate from government sources. Islam Progresif, on the other hand, is more of an umbrella term referring to various strands of thought developed by Muslims opposed to the status quo. Although Islam Hadhari is a newly-coined term, it in fact contains many elements in common with other schools of Islamic thought including Islam Liberal and neo-modernist Islam. The rise of Islam Liberal is a response to the increased prominence of hard-line Islamic movements in Indonesia. It is more of a "bottom up" movement supported by many intellectuals, not only in Indonesia but also in America and the Middle East. In this context, Islam Progresif can be seen as the inheritor of the historical tradition of Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia. In recent years, however, Islam Progresif has tended to be used by some scholars to criticize both Southeast Asian governments and the West, especially America.
In fact, the labeling of Islamic thought is quite confusing for many Southeast Asian Muslims. In Malaysia, many Malays still reject the concept of Islam Hadhari because of its name, while in Indonesia many see the Liberal Islam Network as an orientalist organization which promotes the thinking of infidels. In comparing the different schools of thought and the periods in which they have been developed, perhaps Khaled Abou El-Fadl makes the most apt observation: "All Islamic groups and organization claim to adhere to the fundamentals of Islam; Even the most liberal movement will insist that its ideas and convictions better represent the fundamentals of the faith." 119 [] 
